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 The First Crusade is widely regarded as a pivotal moment in medieval history. Europe 
saw a great massing of tens of thousands of lords, knights, and ordinary people for this 
extraordinary expedition into the Holy Land. The recapture of Jerusalem reverberated throughout 
Christendom. It set the tone for the following centuries. The crusader victory appears to be a 
mystery because of the seeming lack of centralized leadership and planning. Many dismiss the 
Crusade as an aimless expedition in the Middle East that landless younger sons could exploit for 
their own financial gain. Scholars essentially blame the victory on the division of the Islamic 
state. Through close examination, however, it is apparent there was a method to the madness. 
The First Crusade succeeded based on the pivotal role of strategic and logistical forethought, 
communal leadership, and spiritual devotion.  
Initially, the First Crusade appears to be devoid of any caution. Pope Urban II received an 
urgent call ​for assistance from the Byzantine emperor,  Alexius I Comnenus, in driving out the 
Seljuk Turks out of Anatolia. Afterwards, Urban’s call to arms in his Speech at Clermont (1095) 
was answered by both peasants and noblemen alike. The peasants organized under ​Peter the 
Hermit and quickly set out for the Levant despite being undersupplied and having little to no 
combat experience. This group of peasants was called the People’s Crusade and largely failed. 
The knights and nobles to follow would comprise the Prince’s Crusade. The Prince’s Crusade 
would ultimately fulfill the objectives set by Pope Urban II by 1099.  
The crusaders, even though lacking developed supply lines, had deliberate and calculated 
plans. While not overseeing the Crusade personally, Pope Urban II assisted the crusaders by 
setting the grand objective of capturing Jerusalem amongst other things. During his speech at 
Clermont, “The Pope set the time of departure, ordered who should go and who should not go, 
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offered privileges to the participants…”  Urban additionally advised the princes to depart after 1
mid summer so that the crusaders would be well-supplied with food from harvest and enjoy 
somewhat favorable weather for traveling before winter. He made sure to send them to 
Constantinople so that the Byzantine emperor could guide and assist them. Urban’s choice of 
Constantinople for the rendezvous point for the crusade was beneficial in that the city lay on the 
overland route into the Levant. It was important that the crusaders visit the Byzantine emperor 
before embarking to foster good relations between the West and East, as the Western crusaders 
would have to rely on the Byzantines for supplies and reinforcements. Ultimately, Urban’s 
deliberations would prevent the crusaders from failing before setting foot into the Holy Land.  
Although there was a grand plan, there was a lack of consistent supplies, but this absence 
was expected by the crusaders and does not indicate a lack of logistical planning. The 
shortcoming was supplemented by the crusaders living off the surrounding land, surviving 
through subsistence, and later being resupplied by naval support. They would rely on markets 
and foraging as the burden of a long supply chain would be too great. The crusaders planned for 
a lack of supply as evident by their financial preparations. Crusading nobles prepared by 
“liquidating property rights to free up portable wealth” to “accrue equipment and mounts.”  2
Asbridge says, “Archaeological and textual evidence indicates that the Latins brought a wide 
array of European coinage with which to trade during the journey east, seven separate currencies 
being noted in Raymond of Toulouse’s contingent.”  This money would be used to purchase 3
1 ​Munro, Dana C. "The Popes and the Crusades." ​Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society​ 55, no. 5 (1916): 348-56.  
 
2 ​Asbridge, Thomas (2004). ​The First Crusade: A New History​. Oxford. 90. 
 
3 ​Ibid., 90. 
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supplies from the towns along the journey to Jerusalem. The amount of money brought by the 
princes even saved the crusading armies from disaster, specifically in the Battle of Antioch 
where princes gave money to poor crusaders. To this extent, the troop movements of the 
crusaders were based around the depravity of supplies. The separate armies traveled to 
Constantinople in different groups to avoid draining resources from surrounding areas. While the 
crusaders were campaigning, Pope Urban II took the task of encouraging maritime forces to 
support the crusaders intermittently at key ports. A supply fleet “dared to sail through the strange 
and vast surface of the Mediterranean [and] after great trials arrived at Antioch and Latakia in 
advance of our army.”  Effectively, the crusading armies would be resupplied as they progressed 4
to the Levant. The fleets brought desperately needed supplies and reinforcements, and overall 
improved morale. This amount of preparation showcases that the crusaders were well aware of 
the obstacles ahead. In sum, the strategic and logistical foresight was essential to the success of 
the Crusade.  
Furthermore, there is more evidence of strategy in the Battle of Antioch. Asbridge gives a 
summary of events leading up to the siege: 
Raymond of Toulouse had earlier sent a contingent under Peter of Roaix to secure the 
Ruj valley, one of the two southern approaches to Antioch. From Baghras the main army could 
have taken a direct route south to Antioch, but instead they went east around the Lake of Antioch 
to secure fertile plains north-east of the city. Robert of Flanders was dispatched with 1,000 
troops to capture Artah, a fortified town that lay some twenty-two kilometers from Antioch, on 
the intersection of ancient Roman roads from Marash, Edessa, and Aleppo.  5
 
 
4 ​Raimond, John Hugh Hill, and Laurita Lyttleton. Hill. ​Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt 
Iherusalem​. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1968. 134​. 
 
5 ​Asbridge, Thomas (2004). ​The First Crusade: A New History​. Oxford. 157. 
 
  
4 
Capturing Artah was part of a process to eliminate the surrounding defenses of Antioch. While 
allocating manpower for an extraneous mission before the siege of Antioch would certainly have 
been detrimental to the initial fighting capabilities of the crusaders, the manpower was well 
spent. The move spared the sieging armies from harassing forces; the crusaders could now attack 
Antioch freely. With all these instances of strategic and logistical planning, it is quite clear that 
the First Crusade included tactics, contrary to the popular belief that it was a mad, disorganized 
land grab.  
All of the strategic planning would’ve been in vain if the princes’ council did not 
cooperate with each other and foster a sense of unity.  Through communal leadership, the princes 
were able to combine their forces and win. The princes’ council included men such as Raymond 
of Toulouse and Bohemond. When the council was initially founded, they pronounced the 
creation of a “common crusader fund through which all plunder could be channelled and 
redistributed.”  This would allow even the poor crusaders to be equipped with better equipment 6
and have their share of war spoils. The common crusader fund and the leadership’s decision to 
share their wealth in times of despair also aided in the crusader’s perseverance. Stephen of Blois, 
grandson of William the Conqueror, reflected, “Many have already exhausted all their resources 
in this very holy passion [the siege]. Very many of our Franks, indeed, would have met a 
temporal death from starvation, if the clemency of God and the princes’ money had not 
succoured them.”  From the decision of wealth allocation, the council of princes led the 7
6 ​Edgington, Susan B. ​Albert of Aachen: Historia Ierosolimitana: History of the Journey to 
Jerusalem​. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007 32-43. 
 
7 ​Chartres, Foucher De, and Martha Evelyn. McGinty. ​Fulcher of Chartres: Chronicle of the 
First Crusade​. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. 224-226.  
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campaign past roadblocks. Additionally, the princes’ council decided on the strategies that would 
win battles and ultimately lead to the capture of Jerusalem. The council of princes discussed the 
strategy to siege Nicaea and decided on combining the two styles of siege warfare: blockade and 
assault. An unnamed crusader said, “On 14 May 1097 Bohemond and the southern Italian of 
Bouillon and Robert of Flanders were deployed to the east, and work began on a series of siege 
engines.”  Incorporating the two methods was ingenious  as it mercilessly choked the city of 8
Nicaea and defeated the Turkish garrison. Beyond the strategy, the victory may have not been 
possible if the princes didn’t collaborate. The ability for the council to make decisions together 
with efficiency was critical to the success of the Crusade. The council allowed leaders to be 
included in discourse so that factions could be represented properly. Despite the council 
fragmenting as the campaign advanced towards to Jerusalem, it had a lasting effect on the war 
and the crusaders could still rely on the leadership of God.  
When the crusaders had nothing worldly left, they turned to God for assistance. The 
ferocity that the crusaders displayed in combat, specifically in the Battle of Antioch, can be tied 
to their spiritual devotion. In the Speech at Clermont, Pope Urban II invoked images of 
apocalypticism that would’ve persuaded a crusader to fight to the death and essentially become a 
martyr. The crusader would’ve had a preconceived notion of the apocalypse from the Book of 
Revelations. Marshall states that Urban portrayed the clash between Islam and Christianity as 
“good” and “evil.”  Urban said, “​it shall please God to send before the coming of Antichrist, so 9
8 ​Dass, Nirmal. ​The Deeds of the Franks and Other Jerusalem-bound Pilgrims: The Earliest 
Chronicle of the First Crusades​. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Print.  
127-130.  
 
9 ​Baldwin, Marshall W. (1969). ​A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years​. Madison, 
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 27. 
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that the head of all evil, who is to occupy there the throne of the kingdom, shall find some 
support of the faith to fight against him.”  This idea causes apocalypticism to be linked with 10
duality. In every apocalyptic battle, there are good and evil sides, and they are distinctly different 
from each other. Rubenstein argues that since Urban was calling for an earthly battle in 
Jerusalem, and the biblical prophecies had predicted a heavenly battle in Jerusalem- it was 
impossible to not see the link between the two battles. One motivation for people joining the 
First Crusade was that they believed that the Apocalypse was nigh, and they wanted to be in 
Jerusalem when it took place. Additionally, some crusaders believed that by going to Jerusalem, 
they could “set in motion the events of Apocalypse.”  During the Battle of Antioch, the 11
crusaders were able to capture the city, however, a substantial force of Muslims encircled 
Antioch soon after. Under threat of being overrun and supplies and morale dwindling, the 
crusaders were too afraid to break through the Turkish encirclement. Reaching a breaking point, 
the crusaders prayed for “God to return His Lance to the crusaders so as to bring strength and 
victory to His people.” And God answered: “Finally, in His mercy, the Lord showed us His 
Lance and I, Raymond [of Aguilers], the author of this book kissed the point of the Lance as it 
barely protruded from the ground. What great joy and exultation then filled the city.”  The 12
 
10 ​Munro, Dana C. "The Speech of Pope Urban II. At Clermont, 1095." ​The American  
Historical Review​ 11, no. 2 (1906): 231-42.  
 
11 ​Rubenstein, Jay. ​Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse​. New 
York: Basic, 2011. Print. 23. 
 
12 ​Dass, Nirmal. ​The Deeds of the Franks and Other Jerusalem-bound Pilgrims: The Earliest 
Chronicle of the First Crusades​. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Print.  
127-130.  
 
  
7 
“discovery” of the Holy Lance, a Christian relic, imbued the crusaders with renewed spirit and 
courage. Thus, the crusaders made the bold action to rush out of the city and face the Muslim 
army. The crusaders succeeded in battle, due in part to their spiritual motivation by the discovery 
of the Lance. Without the crusaders’ devotion to God, the First Crusade would’ve failed.  
Scholarship, for the most part, has iterated that the primary reason for the crusader’s 
victory is that Islam had serious political and religious fractures during the advent of the First 
Crusade. While this is indeed correct, the other reasons as mentioned in this paper also 
contributed greatly. To undercut these contributing factors’ significance would be foolish. 
Muslim forces put up quite a defense of the cities that they garrisoned. Muslim rulers did resist, 
as in the case of Antioch, which the crusaders finally captured after nine months.  By logic of 13
blaming the divisions that Islam faced for their defeat, that logic could be applied to the 
crusaders as well. Likewise, the crusaders  faced political and religious fractures with the 
princes’ rivalries and the disparity between the East and West. Yet, the crusaders were able to 
demonstrate their military ability in the sieges of Nicaea, Antioch, and Jerusalem - cities on 
which the crusaders  had no prior intelligence. The militarization of Europe due to feudal 
conflicts greatly contributed to the crusaders’ victory. They would’ve had experience already in 
advanced combat tactics of sieging. For these reasons, the council of princes and the strategies 
they implemented were so effective. This warrants at least some credit for the Crusader victory. 
Scholars also discount the religious piety of the crusaders. It is true that the crusaders committed 
barbaric acts during the First Crusade. These barbaric acts, such as pillaging and scorched earth, 
13 ​Dajani-Shakeel, Hadia. ​International Journal of Middle East Studies​ 28, no. 3 (1996): 426-28. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/176399. 
 
  
8 
were not too foreign to the acts they committed back home in Europe. But these crimes should 
not detract from the impact of the crusaders’ devotion. Libertini argues, “On a spiritual and 
moral level, the Crusades offered the chance to redirect militant passions of the knightly class of 
Europe into what was seen as being a truly noble quest, thereby helping countless men to save 
their souls and improve their moral dispositions.”  The Crusade was a religiously charged event, 14
and would never have occurred if the crusaders did not care for their souls. The crusaders were 
motivated spiritually and that is a considerable component of the Crusader victory.  
The First Crusade was not an easy victory for the knights who embarked on the 
campaign, however, they were able to trump seemingly insurmountable odds with planning and 
collective management by the princes and the overarching motivation of salvation. The 
consequence of the First Crusade was more crusades that were less than honorable and poorly 
executed. This paper explored underplayed reasons that the Crusade succeeded and showed that 
nothing should be dismissed. If these factors are rejected, it creates a single story. This single 
story diminishes the planning, brotherhood, and spiritual devotion of the Crusaders. ​What is 
known about the First Crusade is limited by the scope of sources which affects the amount of 
analysis. ​The road ahead for analyzing the First Crusade is simple, one must take an 
interdisciplinary approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 ​"Economic Motives: Were the Crusades Motivated Primarily by Economic Considerations?" 
History in Dispute​, edited by Mark T. Schipper, vol. 10: The Crusades, 1095-1291, St. James 
Press, 2003, pp. 71-78. ​World History in Context​,  Accessed 07 Jan. 2017. 
link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX2877000020/WHIC?u=tlc199095657&xid=f58c78a4. 
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